Introduction
We are in Banania, a small country ruled by a junta favourably supported by the US government. TransnationalMiningCorps wants to build a mine in a local forest and provide employment to 5,000 local people. Farmers are concerned that runoff from the mine will kill their crops; environmentalists that the forest will be clear-cut and yet many locals want the jobs at the mine due to the country's 25% unemployment rate. What do we do? There are many approaches to development and other matters of pressing social concern. One is simply to ignore them, out of apathy or a desire that they would simply disappear. Those concerned with social justice, by contrast, have a world of other choices of approach. In this paper I defend a scientific approach to development by introducing and describing five key virtues of this approach. Before I begin, I would like to immediately forestall disagreement by mentioning that I am not opposed to what I call the "humanistic" approach to development (or any other social concern). It is my view that the scientific approach to social matters in fact complements such approaches nicely. I shall discuss this further as I proceed. The five virtues I would like to discuss are the following:- Corrigibility
- Exactness
- Systematicity
- Transphenomenalism
- Sociotechnology
Corrigibility
It is a truism that our hypotheses (educated guesses) about a social system and the people which compose it are just that - hypotheses - hence likely mistaken but also perfectible (slowly, and never completely) by further inquiry. Nevertheless, sometimes truisms are valuable, and the truism about corrigibility is built in to the scientific ethos - as has been forgotten by the World Bank (until recently) and other organizations. Corrigibility is also connected to testability. If we adopt a viewpoint that is untestable, how are we are to correct it in the light of new evidence, revise it as new situations arise, discard it if is out and out wrong, and so on? Corrigibility also stresses that different parts of a hypothesis can be corrected if it is stated in exact terms, which is my next point ...
Exactness
A hypothesis (or system of same - i.e. a theory) is exact if it has a precise mathematical form (stated in symbols or otherwise: we can sometimes state exact hypotheses in ordinary language). Exactness should not be confused with quantification; it is better to have a qualitative but truer hypothesis in many cases than a less true but quantitative one. Nonquantitative mathematics exists (for example: group theory, set theory, the Euclidean geometry some of us learned in high school), so we need not give up mathematics when we attempt to state a qualitative hypothesis. (Even such elementary mathematics as the theory of orders can be useful in understanding social situations.) Exactness has many virtues. I shall discuss four.- By allowing our concepts to be clearly expressed, it permits us organizing them into systems (theories) with greater ease. This is a desirable goal if we want the benefits of logic: deducing consequences, checking for consistency, etc.
- Greater testability arises through exactness. Consider the two hypotheses from sociology: "Unemployment is related to criminality" versus the exact form C=a+bU, where C is the rate of criminality and U is the rate of unemployment. (Incidentally, this hypothesis is well enough confirmed for many societies to the point one can call it a "law statement".) a and b here are called parameters, and are different for different societies and times. This is one place where the humanistic approach makes contact with the scientific one: local conditions determine the values of the parameters. Hence, local research can uncover them.
- Continuing from the above: the parameters reflect what is unique and local to a given society. But the law statement is a (bounded) universal statement and thus connects to the universalistic aspect of scientific research. It is impossible in general to see this dual aspect to the fuzzy statements of the sort I discussed under (2). Science is necessary because we cannot help but think in general terms; we are finite creatures and must organize our thoughts. But science is possible, because it makes use of specifics. (This way of putting things is paraphrased from Richard Lewontin, a geneticist.)
- Exactness also leads to depth - which is important because social matters are usually anything but superficial, and so our knowledge should reflect that. We start by simply "curve fitting" to obtain the values of the parameters. Later if we need more depth or are interested in it for its own sake, we can hypothesize further relations that determine the values of the parameters, and so on indefinitely. This leads back to point (1), systematicity, which I separated out into its own section.
Richard writes about exactness: Let's see if you did better with the contents of your paper. 'Exactness is one of the conceptual building blocks of the S-O approach.' "A hypothesis is exact if it has precise mathematical form." C=a+bU is the exact form of 'unemployment is related to criminality.' This particular example, you tell us, "is well enough confirmed for many societies to the point that one can call it a 'law statement'". How much 'well' does it take to be 'well enough'? How 'many' does it take to be enough manies to turn a hypothesis into a law statement? Answers to these questions are indeterminate. Chucking in a phrase like "bounded universality" is a cop-out. Arguing by naming is not an argument. 'Law statement' is a name for something whose description can not be adequately specified. It is more agreeable to call a hypothesis that does not hold well enough at many times in many places an invalid hypothesis. That's what the rest of the world calls them.Keith responds to Richard's remarks about hypothesis testing ... I am asked how well confirmed my example exact hypothesis is. At the 5% confidence level, from what I understand. This raises another large area I skirted, hoping to discuss it later as it is a sufficiently technical matter that it will require a lot of patience on the part of the reader to follow. It is very important, however, and Richard is right to stress it. Determining the warrant for any hypothesis is not an easy matter. My particular example is called a law statement because it is included in some theories of criminality and seems to be sufficiently true. (As I said, at the 5%.) So, the answer to Richard's remark "How many?" is not at all indeterminate, but well characterized by the statistical procedures I will discuss elsewhere.Keith responds to Richard's remarks about bounded universal statements ... The question of bounded universality is also important but I am afraid Richard has not understood it, as far as I can tell. "Bounded universality" is a name applied to the quantifiers in virtually every branch of science. For example, in chemistry, we are implicitly bounding the universal quantifier in "hydrogen reacts with oxygen to form water" to a specific (if perhaps unknown) temperature range. It is known that chemical reactions do not occur below a certain temperature (as molecular motion is too slow) or above a certain amount (for example in stars) where the electrons are unable to be bound to atomic nuclei and cannot thus cannot take place in reactions. That the laws of chemistry are not thereby spatiotemporally universal does not bound their universality within the appropriate range. Moreover, the law statement about hydrogen and oxygen is still applicable to an indefinite number of other cases. This too makes it universal in that sense. (I do not want to be taken as claiming all scientific hypotheses are of this form, though; there are some that are not. For example, "There is a planetoid in our solar system beyond Pluto" is one of a different form one that has been debated recently.) And Richard is quite right to say that if a hypothesis does not hold well enough, it is falsified. This is right, but irrelevant, as I trust the discussion above makes clearer.
Systematicity
Scientific research reminds us that the world is a system of systems of systems - and not just a heap of individuals or a solid block. This extends to the social world as well and hopefully our knowledge of it. My teacher, Mario Bunge (philosopher of science) has stressed this fact in what he calls the "BPEC schema" for understanding social facts. I shall illustrate how even such a simple occurrence as a marriage has these four components: biological, political, economic, and cultural. (Environmental factors fall under "biological" in this schema.)Richard writes about systematicity: All this effort spent on one aspect [See also his comments on paper 2 for more on the previous topic - K.D.] of the S-O Approach is not excessive. While I have already shown, I believe, that that Approach, as presented, simply does not fly, we can use what we've learned on another aspect. You call it Systematicity. "Science research tells us that the world is a system of system of systems ...This extends to the social world as well ...". If we allow the first, must we accept the extention? Better not. In the first place we have causal ideas that apply exclusively to the social world. Motives and emotions are causes. Secondly people, and nothing but people, live with futures in view. Their ambitions, projects, plans, hopes, and so on all have that sooner and later quality. Today's activity is in anticipation of some near or further future. Thirdly only people accumulate and lose resources they need and use to try to realize their futures. Fourthly only people enter into and drop out of groupings with others in pursuit of their interests. Fifthly, only people have interests. Sixthly only people can and do change their minds. It's stretching to call or include this indeterminate future a system. Speculate about your next year, about next month. Do you 'see' a system? You are not alone. You give one purported example of a system within a system in the social world. Your example is "a simple occurence of a marriage" (sic!). Yet no frosh sociology text calls marriage a system; everyone of them calls it an institution. I'll tell you that without even looking. While a social institution may be studied systematically, the thing studied does not thereby become a system. I could ask you to explain why you chose to extend the systems of the natural world to the social world. You would, I am sure, given reasons. That's the easy part. The hard part would be to convince me, and first to convince yourself, whether your reasons are derived from scientific knowledge and not from ordinary knowledge. Are your reasons scientifically sound? It's something to think about seriously . And so is this - The natural world is a system of systems within systems. Is it? Some scientists know that it is not. They know their science and they know about reality. Before quantum mechanics physicists and billiard players could tell us about the quantities that causally fix the path of a particle after another particle crashes into it. Hit it this way and it ends up here. Since quantum mechanics (1925) only billiard players can still tell us. The other guys and gals have observed that electrons aren't actual things located at specific points in space and time. They are probability events. While the episodes of the events can be predicted, the outcomes (which path ends up where?) cannot. Out go those litter solar-like systems with the nucleus in the middle surrounded by electrons in fixed orbits one quantum apart. In fact nobody ever observed them. That was an image Niels Bohr developed. It served well for a while. Until the findings and conclusion, "the only thing that can be predicted is the probability of events". It's a view of reality without cause and effect and which snubs space and time based on observation. Einstein, who participated importantly in the development of quantum mechanics, after he finished bending light and time, grew not to like it, grew to rage against it. But the only reasons he ultimately had against it he drew from ordinary knowledge. He joined the billiard players. Probabilities cannot be described as or transformed into systems. Or systems within systems. Where have all the systems gone? Where has Systematicity gone? A label in search of a victim. You have some important work to do. As indicated, neither the ordinary meaning of 'system' nor a scientific meaning, which comes to the same meaning, describes social relaity. (Sometimes we speak of behaviour patterns, but patterns are not systems.) And even if 'systems of systems' is a figure useful in some areas of science it is not so in most. What exactly is 'scientific' about your 'systems'? What is it you have in mind concerning it that is not ordinary knowledge? These questions are important. Why? Because 'ordinary' and 'scientific' are more than classification headings for you. They are bearerss of messages. They are claim-making words. You showed your hand with the 'science skewers non-science viewpoints' assertion. Science is trump knowledge. So the importance of the explanation is, what happens to Systematicity if you can't raise it out of the slime of ordinary knowledge? And what happens to the pretended superior status of the S-O Approach if one of its founding concepts is an ordinary mole?
Keith responds to Richard's remarks about systems, causation, etc. ... I have made use of "system" several times in my reply: Richard calls me to task for not making it clear what I mean. Richard gives a "laundry list" about what is different about humans as opposed to other animals, plants and hence also to nonliving things. This is quite important. There are differences (though I have my doubts about the second and the third). But I am not sure what this has to do with systems. A system is a time variable (as Richard says) collection of individuals tied together with ties of some kind. A molecule is a system of atoms held together by shared electrons or electrostatic attraction. Similarly a social system is a system with people as components or perhaps as components of components, etc. For example, a religious organization might have as components individual congregations held together by a source of common doctrine or beliefs. Each individual congregation may in turn be composed of individuals held together by geographic proximity or economic status or fondness for a particular member of the clergy, or whatever else. Richard also stresses rightly that social systems (and indeed, sociality in general) passes through people's heads. There are thus sciences that are at once social and natural. There is even a field called "physiological social psychology", which studies the nervous system components that maintain our social behaviour. Perhaps Richard or our readers have heard of Phinaeus Gage, who suffered an interesting injury as a result of a tragic work accident. Gage was a railroad constructor and suffered an injury to the frontal lobes of his brain when a tamping iron was thrown through his skull during an explosion. He lived, and was remarkably unaffected, except that the previously well-liked and pleasant man was now one that could not be friendly or respectful to anyone. His coworkers said of him that he "was not Gage." The discipline of physiological social psychology was born when Gage's physicians studied his behaviour and injury and later his brain after he died. Richard asks if this knowledge of systems comes from scientific knowledge or ordinary knowledge. The answer to that is both. As it happens scientific knowledge here confirms an every day piece of knowledge. (This does happen, though perhaps less often than many including me! realize.) Contemporary philosophers study the general nature of systems - including the inexact characterization I have given above of them - in the subfield called metaphysics. So in this sense we have three sources of knowledge of systems. (We might add knowledge about how to change or maintain some of them from technological investigations, too.) Richard disputes the merits of the systemic approach based on his understanding of causation. I am not sure I understand the point. Causation is about how the world changes - and I will return to this in a moment. I have suggested that the way to approach the world is to make use of the hypothesis that the world is made up of systems. (Whether there are any ultimate foundational elements such as electrons which apparently have no structure is irrelevant to this and somewhat irrelevant to social science and to sociotechnology, which was our primary point of discussion.) Thus the two topics, causation and systemism alike are both important. They are complementary rather than exclusive. (In fact, Mario Bunge has written books about each one, and tied them together, showing how they relate.) I did not wish to discuss causation because it is again a very technical matter and an introduction should not bog the reader down in details. But since Richard has raised the point, I am happy to address it. He brings up quantum mechanics. It is true that quantum mechanics restricts the domain of causation. It is not true, however, that quantum mechanics is completely acausal. For example, a typical problem involves determining the direction a charged particle exits from a given field. There is a causal component to this problem: the field exerts an influence on the particle. But the particle's own self-activity also affects its trajectory. This is usually understood to occur in a "dice throwing" way - but it is not thereby arbitrary. One can calculate the likelihood that the particle goes up rather than down, for example. This behaviour occurs in well-defined patterns - i.e. "in accordance with" laws. These laws just happen to be statistical, as are many other well-known laws in science, including the social sciences. (I should point out that even mechanics was not causal at the advent of the quantum theory. Newton's laws of motion also allow for a limited form of self-activity on the part of bodies in inertial motion.) All that is to say that (a) "causality" is still a useful concept, though with a limited range after all no quantum mechanics is needed to launch the space shuttle or in most mechanical engineering problems and (b) the increased restriction of the applicability of causation does not change science - in fact it illustrates how methodological (or philosophical) issues in science are itself subject to scientific revision. This brings me to the important point about where systems have gone. I believe I have answered this, but let me point how important an assumption it is. If it were so ordinary, it wouldn't be contentious. Let's start by taking two (in my view) extreme political slogans. "You are nothing, your people is everything."
"There is no such thing as society, there are only individuals."
The first of these is a translation (mine) of a Nazi slogan. The second is a quotation attributed to Margaret Thatcher. I have selected these because they illustrate two of the alternatives to the question of systems. I suggest that systemism as I have defended it is alternative to both of these approaches. The Nazi thesis is one of holism: people are a solid block, a featureless whole, "the people". The other slogan is the converse, one of individualism: there are just "atoms" free floating with no ties or connections of any kind to each other. The systemic alternative is recognizing that there are ties we have to each other but not ones that are rigid to the point of being unchangeable or overpowering to the extent that we are submerged and lose our individuality. Which hypothesis about the world should we adopt? Well, this depends on our approach. If we want to keep life easy, we might take one of the two extremes. But that would be a choice based on convenience rather than truth. Even in economics, which I agree for the moment is contaminated by ideology, the choice to adopt an individualistic approach has lead to problems. For example, economists have to speak of "the market" which individuals partake in. This amounts to positing what in my view is the bad side of both viewpoints: isolated individuals and a featureless unanalysed block: what Bunge calls "individholism". "Individual in society," rather than "Individual and society" or "Society" is thus what I claim is the way to go. The three alternatives look like this:![]()
P: marriages create partnerships between families - or the reverse! - and hence change power relations in a society. Why else did royalty pay so much attention to who was marrying whom?
E: marriages also pool resources of production whether of capital, labour or whatever else.
C: marriages involve the cultural aspects of life, such as religious ceremonies and traditions, feasting, gift exchanges, etc.
But any social fact has many aspects that are not apparent to us, so this brings me to:
Transphenomenalism
This rather long word is coined to reflect the importance of going beyond our senses to the aspects of social events, processes, states that are not visible, audible, etc. These aspects we must conjecture about in order to understand, manipulate or prevent others from manipulating them. For example, what goes on inside people's heads is a very important influence on social facts. Ideologies, religions, non-scientific viewpoints about society itself or individuals' roles in it, fragments of scientific ideas, superstitions, etc. all affect how people act and react in groups and associations. Social facts proper also have many transphenomenal components. To return to my simple sociological example, C=a+bU (interpreted as I did above) contains two transphenomenal concepts: criminality rate and unemployment rate. The factors that determine the values of the parameters are even more unapparent to us. That is why there are as yet no well-established scientific hypotheses about them. Because scientific research creates hypotheses that are deep and unobvious, "transphenomenalism" also leads us immediately back to my earlier point about testability. To coin a motto: "Audacious (but grounded and testable!) conjecturing, rigorous testing." (I omit how one goes about testing hypotheses, since this would quadruple the length of the paper, at least.) Once we know something about how a social fact operates to some degree, we can then intervene to modify it (e.g. attempt to reduce criminality) or prevent another from doing something to it, which brings me to our next point:
Sociotechnology
I understand technology in the broadest possible sense, to include any rational action informed by scientific research. Hence there are (or ought to be, at any rate) sociotechnologies. Examples might include management, normative economics, criminology, etc. Like natural technology (e.g. electrical engineering, some aspects of forestry and pharmaceutical research) sociotechnology differs from crafts in that it has roots in science, rather than ordinary knowledge. Like them as well, it is not always needed - but to find out when it is and isn't needed is itself a matter of scientific (rather than technological) research, at least in part. (I suggest this to avoid dogmatic answers of either uncritical acceptance or rejection.) Unlike basic science, technology is not morally neutral. This is because technology (by construction) involves plans to put artefacts (natural or social) into use and not merely an explanation or description of some aspect of the world. We should thus include in sociotechnologies - including various aspects of social planning - intended uses and impacts. This "puts our ethics on our sleeves" and thus opens the whole process up to rational criticism, debate and modification. In the next paper I shall discuss sociotechnology in greater detail and what roles it does and doesn't have in social development and related concerns.
Richard writes more about ethics: A final word on ethics and science which will get us around to the first phrase in my title. C=a+bU cannot be morally neutral, at least not until we know who's who. For the criminals and those who risk becoming criminals, their victims and those who risk becoming victims, and the unemployed and those at risk of unemployment are all people with lives, but not all people with the same lives. The effects of impacts on the various people consequent to policies according to the "neutral" equation cannot be ascertained from the variables and parameters of the equation. Nor can the evaluation of the total outcomes. The equation does not care a hoot for who the criminals and potential criminals, the unemployed and near-unemployed are, nor for who, out of the larger population and of the labour force, will join the ranks. C=c+dR is a more direct illustration. You say the emperor is neutral; I am telling you he wears no clothes. We have seen that the U and R equations may be equal as statements of the 'reason for doing something' kind. But they cannot simultaneously be equal in consequences on lives. It may easily happen that (from a science view) the stronger equation is the less morally acceptable. We can look backward over our actions and conclude we did wrong, or we can look forward before our acts to try to do right. With this thought in mind, it is clear that science cannot be the starting point for policy decisions. We can decide on the ethics and then evaluate various possible alternative actions to get the best results. We may conclude, after reviewing alternatives, that ordinary-knowledge technology may bring more commendable results than the other kind. (We saw a likely example of that.) In any event this is not a Science-Oriented Approach. Here the weighing scale is not what wins most scientific support but what most reduces daily frustration, broken hopes and broken lives. Science is adapted, bent, and if need be abandoned in favour of ethical living. There is no scientific way to make atom bombs. Science, like marriage, is a social institution. Whatever else it is, it's something people do within social settings. Science is a society 'is' and a societal 'does'. You can subject it to the 'BPEC schema'. That's not such a bad idea. You'll soon see it's not all purity and light. How does a society choose between the U and the R equations (to stick to those two)? Well, to say something trivial but true, the choice is made in context. Here's one such context. "In a civilized world," wrote the historian Trevor-Roper, "such men [as H] are seldom tolerated; but if we look back at the cataclysmic periods of society, at periods of revolution and violent social change, H's prototype is there. It is the Grand Inquisitor, ... the man who is prepared to sacrifice humanity to an abstract ideal. The Grand Inquisitors of history were not cruel or self-indulgent men. They were often painfully conscientious and austere in their personal lives. They were often scrupulously kind to animals ...". A good neighbour and respected member of the community. That is the setting: time and place, or rather many times and many places. What, in those settings, do scientists do? They do research, discover, invent whatever serves the needs of the day. (That's where the funding goes.) Public and private investors set up new laboratories to try to isolate pure Aryan blood; the scientific institute Ahnenerbe made expensive researchers into Aryan origins; an explorer was sent to Tibet to discover traces of a pure German race; chemists successfully developed Cylon B to replace inefficent carbon monoxide; professors at the Reichsuniversity at Strassbourg studied comparitive skull anatomy. Such commotion in the sciences. Dr. Philipp Lenord, Nobel laureate in physics, announced to colleagues throughout the world, "Natural science, properly so called, is of completely Aryan origin, and Germans must today also find their way into the unknown". That was back in 1933. The more efficent extermination gas came ten years later. It was indeed an age of science. At the day would they have chosen the U or the R equation? No question about it. And after that had run its course they would have concocted the bounded universal law statement D=e+fR where R is still race and D is Degeneracy. Would have? In fact they did.
Keith responds to Richard's final remarks about ethics ... Richard then returns to the moral neutrality thesis. It is true that any policy informed by the sample law statement would miss dealing with who is at risk for criminality or unemployment and similar matters. All this is important. I never meant to suggest that one should base any policy on such a simple finding alone. This extends to deciding whether we want a technological (in the broad sense) or a craft solution to whatever interests us (or a "do nothing" solution). This extends to weapons and the atom bombs Richard mentions, of course. I only argue it should never be abandoned. This is too strong. Why are atom bombs so horrific? Surely because we know that radiation (for example) is so deadly - this in itself required scientific research to find out. This is in fact a great example of the utility of science: since radioactivity is for the most part invisible, it is very inaccessible to ordinary knowledge. (And radioactivity is of course not completely synthetic either, so it is not merely a matter of discovering "what we wrought.") And science is a social activity and is analyzable using the BPEC schema, I agree. Richard seems to think that this will show it to be impure. I agree - there are many times where people have subverted it in favour of other goals or values. But how are we to know this? How do we know that Lysenko was an ideologue? We can have moral outrage against the Mengel's of the world (of which more later), but why? It is true that we do not need to study the matter to determine that Jews are humans, or whatever else. But people are not often so easily spotted. Again, how do we know that Lysenko was going to be bad for Soviet agriculture? His hypothesis, one might call "Lamarckian" in character, was a serious scientific hypothesis to that extent at one time - for example, held by Darwin himself. It was also held by common sense. But Mendel was the first to suggest that this was wrong, and the "new synthesis" of the early 20th century clinched it. But the ideological influence on and corruption of scientific research does not explain the origin of all scientific hypotheses. For example, let us take a look at Maxwell's equations. These four equations describe the interrelationships between electricity and magnetism. Do these contain somehow the setting of Maxwell's life? How is Faraday's contribution determined, then, since Maxwell owed some of his starting point to him? Both were British, to be sure, but their social lives apart from that were very different. The sociological investigation of science is important, but it must not be exaggerated to the point of suggesting that science is contaminated through and through: in any case, Richard has not provided evidence for this all-too-common thesis. Illustrating by a case where ideology affected some research - and here many of the examples are just examples of the selection of programs, not even contaminated answers as in the case of Lysenko - is not sufficient. Moreover, since the ordinary approaches to knowledge are also likely contaminated too, what are we to do? Nothing? Ignorance seems to be unfortunate. At least with scientific approaches (and we can borrow this for ordinary life, too!) we can be explicit with what we are defending so that others may criticize it methodologically, etc. The equation Richard proposes is thus open to criticism of the kind I suggest. It is not even at the stage where anyone could claim to have confirmed it. It is not well formed, which brings me back to my earlier remarks about warrant.
Keith expands further on warrant ... I warned the reader of the first materials that discussing warrant and other important issues connected to it was vital but very time consuming. Since much of what I dealt with above in the response to Richard's criticism deals with these, I felt I would take the time to deal with them in a bit more detail. There are several stages in validating a hypothesis of any kind. Scientific research suggests several of these that can also be employed in every day life - and in many cases we do apply them. Much more could be said about all of these; whole books for instance are devoted to statistical methods. Before determining the degree of truth of a hypothesis, one has to check for three desirata. (i) The hypothesis must be well formed (formally correct) Richard's last "equation" is not well formed in this sense. How does one multiply "blacks" by anything? Proportion of blacks in the population, or absolute numbers, or whatever, is better. There is nothing wrong with including it as a variable, either. It is true, for example, that criminality is higher in certain human groups than others. Finding out the extent to which this is so is a first step in finding out why: if we do not investigate why, we are quite open to someone simply declaring a solution. This to me is what we should find ethically dubious. (Similarly for his bit about head sizes: as it happens there are differences in skull sizes between different groups of humans. Nothing much follows from this. These findings, amongst others, were used in investigating the graves in Northern Canada to help to determine the relations between the so-called Dorset Eskimos and the so-called Thule Eskimos. So the Nazi usage is one; the historical and social interest in that latter use is another. Once again this illustrates ethical neutrality. If one then proposes that one should exterminate - or praise! - one group based on their skull size, we have in some sense a technological proposal, albeit a rather useless - and no doubt unpopular one. I am not claiming that ethical neutrality of the hypotheses that eventually lead to technological proposals entails that the proposals in question are of equal plausibility under any measure.) (ii) The hypothesis must be grounded to some extent. Our hypotheses must be compatible with a large portion of background knowledge. This is because we need certain other hypotheses in order to test what is currently under debate. For example, many of us have had experience measuring properties of elementary circuits: resistances and voltage drops and so on. The dials of the meters used in these exercises presuppose Newton's laws of motion, as they are designed with these hypotheses in mind. (iii) Finally, the hypothesis must be empirically testable with objective procedures. These of course vary depending on the scientific field. Social science is hard because there are so many confounding factors to interfere with those of interest at a given time. How does one confront hypotheses with data, once one has a sufficiently well formed, well-grounded hypothesis? Testing requires developing indicators for what we want to measure: Richard's second equation is thus also unfortunate because it doesn't tell us in the slightest how to measure degeneracy. As it stands this is an example of a pseudoquantity. An example one sees of this all the time is the ratings of movies: there is no (well grounded) procedure by which one can measure whether Casablanca is a better or worse movie than Dumb and Dumber. We don't even know that "better or worse" is best reconstructed as a scalar quantity. This is not so critical a case; one can decide on one's own whether or not to see a movie based on other factors. But when it comes to determining the way our society is arranged, then it matters more. (It arguably matters still more if we decide to change our society or leave it be based on this knowledge or lack of.) The most elementary means of testing is to hold the hypothesis fixed, and derive a consequence. This often means building (in thought and on paper) a small ideal model of the system in question so as to find out how the hypotheses interrelate. From there it is possible to find a sufficiently basic statement to confront with data. This is often where auxiliary hypotheses are employed, as in the case of the meters discussed above. From there we can measure the discrepancy between our data and our hypothesis - how the relation between hypothesis and the proposition actually confronted with the data is to be construed varies from case to case. This usually involves statistical processing. The more unlikely a hypothesis the more stringent a standard we apply in the statistics - at least in physics. Part of the problem with some literature on "alternative medicine" is that the confidence intervals used are too large. In the case of purported treatments - or their physiological grounding - that would, if correct, contradict extremely well confirmed hypotheses of other kinds, there have been calls (e.g. by physicist Vic Stenger) for higher statistical standards to rule out chance effects. There are such "treatments" that would create oodles of Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry if correct; these are the ones I have in mind. A few remarks on this background checking, as it is often poorly understood. This is the hardest feature of science to understand, even by scientists and philosophers who have studied the problem. A useful analogy is to the crossword puzzle, popularized by Susan Haack. When one is doing science, there are other entries "written on the puzzle already" - the background. One can change the background - here and there - but since the crossword is HUGE and has oodles filled in from time immemorial (including stuff from ordinary experience) there is a lot that will just not change much. The current entry one is working on in the puzzle is one's current problem - it is constrained by what is there, but never quite completely - sometimes new findings do occur and have large or small ramifications on other entries. This analogy breaks down in one respect that I feel is crucial, though. This is that hypotheses often get subsumed, rather than replaced. For example, it is often possible to "recover" Newton's laws in relativistic mechanics by letting the speed of light be very large relative to the velocities of bodies under consideration. This explains why Newton's laws were thought more or less correct for a long time and why they still are - they are just thought slightly less correct than they once were.
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